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IX THE DISTRICT COFnrr OF 'J HE FIFTll
.JuDJCIAL DI8TRlCT JN AND FOR 'I_'HE
COUNTY OF \VASHIN'GTOX, STATE OF "CTAH
1

St. George and Washington Canal
Comp2.ny, a corporation,
Plaintiff
vs.
Hurricane Canal Company,
a corporation,

STIPULATION.

Defendant.

It is stipulated and agreed by and between the St. George and

Washington Canal Company, Plaintiff, and by the Hurricane Canal
Company, Defendant, and by the La Verkin Bench Canal Company,
an interested party, in the above case:
1. That during the period of low water none of the waters oi
Ash Creek rising above the Town of Toquerville, enters or forms a
part of the Rio Virgen.
2. That during the period of low water, none of the waters of the
East Fork of the Rio Virgen, rising above Mount Carmel, in Kane
County, reaches that part of the Rio Virgen in Washington County.
so as to be available for irrigation purposes in said County.
3 And it is further stipulated, that the Decree determining the
water rights of the parties at interest in the waters of the Rio
Virgen, so far as the above waters are concei·ned, may be entered
in a~ordance with this stipulation?
In Witness whereof, the said Compan?Jes have hereunto attached
their names, and affixed their official seals this 2nd day of April.
1925.
FILED
Fifth Judicial District Court
Washington Co11nty, Utah
April 4, 1925
/s/ William Brooks
Clerk

St. George and Washington Canal Co.
By /s/ Richard A. Morris
President
Hurricane Canal Company
By /fl/ James W. Imlay
President
LaVerken Bench Canal Company
By /s/ Samuel Webb, Pres.

Source: Exhibit 2, file marked "1919-1935, exhibits, counterclai.ms.
etc." Burton Decree proceedings. Case No. 270, Washwg·
ton County.
This file is divided by years. The foregoing document appears as
page 1 immediately following the 1925 index.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH
St. George & Washington Canal Co.,
a corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.

ORDER

Hurricane Canal Co., a corporation,
Defendant.
This case came on regularly for hearing at St. George, Washington County, Utah, April 10, 1925, after due notice to all parties
and all parties objecting to the State Engineer's proposed determination having either appeared personally in court or by stipulation
filed herein, and all parties consented that the court render its
decree in accordance with the proposed determination of the State
Engineer filed herein as amended and corrected by said stipulation
with the exception of that of the Virgin Canal Company, Virgin,
Utah, who objected to the amount of water allowed from Blue
Springs to Robert A. Thorley of Cedar City, Utah, page 15, State
Engineer's proposed determination.
It appears from the petition filed herein that the State Engineer
and his assistants have worked earnestly to get a stipulation between the above named parties but have been unable to do so.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
I.

That this objection come for hearing before this court the 26

day of October 1925, at 2 p.m.

**
**

Dated Oct. 9, 1925

/s/ Thos H. Burton
Judge

Source: Exhibit 2, file marked "1919-1935, answers, counterclaims,
etc." Burton Decree proceedings, case No. 270, Washington
County. Page 8 following 1925 index.
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IN THE DTSTIUCT COUH11 OF' '11 HE FIFTH
JFDICIAL DTSTHIC'L' lN AND FOR T !TE
COUl\TY OF \YASHIXGTON, S'l'A'I'E OF ll'l'A!I
St. George & \Vashington Canal Co.,
a corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Hurricane Canal Co., a corporation,
Defendant.

l

PETITION

J

Comes now George M. Bacon, the duly appointed, qualified and
acting State Engineer of the State of Utah and shows the Court:
I.
T~rnt this case came on regularly for hearing at St. George.
Washington County, Utah, Dec. 12, 1925, after due notice to all
parties, and all parties objecting to the State Engineer's proposed
determination having either appeared personally in court or by
stipulation filed heren, and all parties consented that the court
render its decree in accordance with the proposed determination of
the State Engineer filed herein as amended and corrected by said
stipulation ·with the exception of that of the Virgin Canal Co., Vil"
gin. Utah, who objected to the amount of water allowed from Blue
Springs to Robert A. Thorley of Cedar City, Utah, page 15, State
Engineer's proposed determination.
IV.
That the determination of the State Engineer, as amended and
co1 rected by the stipulations, gives the amount of water which is to
be allowed to each of the parties of this suit in cubic feet per second
and acre feet divided into classes 1, 2 and 3."H'

*

~+

Geo. M. Bacon
State Engineer
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 21st day of October 1926.
D. H. Morris
Notary Public
Residence: St. George, Utah
My Commission Expires:
April 15, 1928
FILED
Fifth Judicial District Court
Washington County, Utah
October 21, 1926
William J. Brooks, Clerk
By Laura A. Gates
Deputy Clerk
Source: Exhibit 2, file marked "1919-1935, answers, counterclaim-'
etc." Burton Decree proce2dings, Case No. 270, WashiM·
ton County. Pages 2-4 following 1926 index.
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IN 'l HE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF vVASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH
1

St. George & Washington Canal Co.,
a corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Hurricane Canal Co., a corporation,
Defendant.

ORDER

This case came on regularly for hearing at St. George, Washington County, Utah, Dec. 12, 1925, after due notice to all parties,
and all parties objecting to the State Engineer's Proposed Determination having either appeared personally in court or by stipulation
filed herein, and all parties consented that the court render its
decree in accordance with the proposed Determination of the State
Engineer filed herein as amended and corrected by said stipulations,
with the exception of that of the Virgin Canal Co., Virgin, Utah, who
objected to the amount of water allowed from Blue Springs to
Robert A. Thorley of Cedar City, Utah, page 15, State Engineer's
proposed determination, which objections were thereupon heard
and disposed of, and it appearing from a statement of the State
Engineer that in making his determination in this suit costs amounting to $4456.35 were incurred, which costs were necessary and
properly incurred in making said determination, and having shown
lhe court that it is necessary that this sum of money be repaid to
the State Engineer for use in connection with the adjudication of
water rights on other streams as provided by law,
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
[costs are apportioned among decreed owners]
Thos. H. Burton
Judge
Dated: Oct 27-1926
x- -:+

FILED
In Fifth Judicial District Court
Washington County, Utah
November 3, 1926
William Brooks, Clerk
By Laura A. Gates
Source: Exhibit 2, file marked "1919-1935, answers, counterclaims,
etc." Burton Decree proceedings, case No. 270, Washington County. Pages 6, 7 following 1926 index.
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SCHEDFLE OF \YA'l'ERS A WARDJ•=D THREE :MAJOR USERS UNDER
"I\lC CARTY" DECREE AS CO:MPAR~D Wl11 H "BPRTON-COX" DECREE
BURTON-COX DECREE
[Awarded to all "Class 1"
Distributes Water Based
on Volume of Flow (c.f.s.)]

MC CARTY DECREE
(Divided Entire East Fork
into 1,201-1/3 shares
without preference)
TOT AL SHARES AWARDED

THREE MAJOR USERS

434-1/3

GLENDALE IRRIGATION COMPANY

7.23

265-1/2

ORDERVILLE IRRIGATION COMPANY

4.42

404-5/6

l\'IT. CARMEL IRRIGATION COMPANY

6.58

1,104-2/3 SHARES

TOT AL C.F.S. AWARDED

TOT AL AW ARDS TO THREE MAJOR USERS

C.F.S. 18.23

PERCENTAGES OF AGGREGATE AWARDS
TO THE THREE MAJOR USERS:
1,104-2/3 /434-1/3 =

39.3%

GLENDALE IRRIGATION COMP ANY

18.23 /7.23 =

39.6%

1,104-2/3 /265-1/2 =

23.9%

ORDERVILLE IRRIGATION COMPANY

18.23 /4.42 =

24.3%

1,104-2/3 /404-5/6 =

36.8%

MT. CARMEL IRRIGATION COMPANY

18.23 /6.58 =

36.1 %

100.0%

100.0%
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In the Supreme Court
of the State of IJtall

ORDERVILLE IRRIGATIONF
COMPANY, a corporation; MT.
CARMEL IRRIGATION COMPANY, a corporation; HENRY CARROLL, MERRILL MacDONALDJ-_ _..__.~.•~.::
HOWARD SPENCER, LYLE
CHAMBERLAIN, M. G. HOLGATE, GRANT HEATON, FRED
MAJOR, DUKE AIKEN and DUN;.·, '
CAN MacDONALD,

Plaintif/.'J and Res~,">·

.:/·

-~.

VB.

•«I;. •t

GLENDALE IRRIGATION ce.~.
PANY, and WAYNE D. ClllJ)l)
Utah State· Engineer,

Defendants aM, A,>,ei~ . t-'

: ,.~ 1: ~~

APPELL\'
ON APPEAL FROM THB'
SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTlUC'r
UTAH, IN AND FOR
'

'•' <¢;'

HONORABLE FJilBDDll'..QU> .

cuN:m

An

By&.

Milf~ ..'.

Attontlp.
Glendee 1

DALLill

w. J

Salt Lab ·
Attor•6'J /.ff..:,
Wagflie· D.

OLSEN ANID CHAMBERLAIN

Richfield, Utah,
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
and Respondents

.

'
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In the SupreIDe Court
of the State of Utah

ORDERVILLE IRRIGATION
COMPANY, a corporation; MT.
CARMEL IRRIGATION COMPANY, a corporation; HENRY CARROLL, MERRILL MacDONALD,
HOWARD SPENCER, LYLE
CHAMBERLAIN, M. G. HOLGATE, GRANT HEATON, FRED
MAJOR, DUKE AIKEN and DUNCAN MacDONALD,
Plaintiffs anrl RPspondents,

Case No. 10325

vs.
GLENDALE IRRIGATION COMPANY, and WAYNE D. CRIDDLE,
Utah State Engineer,
Defenda11ts and Appdlaut.~
APPELLANTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF rrnE KIND OF GASE
This rase is one involving the respective priorities
of water rights belonging to plaintiffs and respondents
and the Glendale Irrigation Company, defendant and
on0 of the appc·llnnts.

2

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Summary judgment was granted by the Honorable
Ferdinand Erickson, Judge of the District Court in and
for Kane County, Utah, in favor of the plaintiffs, granting the relief asked for in the amended complaint.
RmLIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
This appeal is taken jointly by the defendants Glendale Irrigation Company and the State Engineer, for a
determination by this Honorable Court reversing the
said summary judgment and remitting this cause to the
District Court with a mandate to grant the defendant's
motion for a summary judgment; or in the event it is
determined the defendants are not entitled to a summary
judgment, that the case be remitted back to the District
Court for a trial on the merits.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiffs are Orderville Irrigation Company, a corporation, Mt. Carmel Irrigation Company, a corporation, and a number of individuals claiming water rights
on the East Fork of the Virgin River located in Kane
County. Defendant Glendale Irrigation Company, a corporation, also has a water right on the East Fork of
the Virgin River.
All of these water rights are set forth as Awards
Nos. 1 to 30-B in the printed Virgin River System De·

3
aee; and on pages 64 to 69 inclusive in the supplemental
and final decree-File marked August 10, 1935, of original adjudication files, and file marked 1930-1932 ''Supplemental and Final Decree'' pages 2 to 10 inclusive.
The plaintiffs commenced this action for a judgment declaring that the McCarty Decree, dated the 18th
day of April, 1900, made and entered in the case of Mt.
Carmel Irri.oation Company, et al., vs. Joseph Hopkins;
et al., (Kane County) should prevail over the decree in
the case of St. George and 'Vashing-ton Canal Company,
a corp., plaintiffs, vs. Hurricane Canal Company, a corporation, defendants. This latter case was one adjudicating all of the waters on the Virgin River System.
The first decree in this general adjudication suit is dated
December 12, 1925, signed by Thos. H. Burton, Judge,
and is commonly called the Burton Decree. A final decree is dated the 21st day of April, 1931, signed by LeRoy H. Cox, Judge, and is sometimes referred to as the
Cox Decree.
The water rights of the plaintiffs in the case at bar
were rights involved in the old McCarty Decree of 1900;
and which decree makes no mention of priorities as between the water users but recites that the parties are
entitled to and are the owners of certain proportions
of the stream. In both the general adjudication decrees
of 1925 and the final decree of 1931, the priorities of the
plaintiff corporations are found in awards as follows:

4

Orderville Irrigation Co. award No. 21, priority
date 1871.
Mt. Carmel Irrigation Co. award No. 22, prioritv
date 1870.
The priorities of the plaintiff individuals or their
predecessors in interest, together 'vith the prioritieR of
many other water users on the East Fork of the Virgin
River are founu in the general adjudication decrees of
the Virgin River in awards Nos. 1 to and including 30A,
with one right as early as 1865, one at 1867, a few at
1870, and a large number at 1890 and thereafter.
The priority of the defendant Glendale Irrigation
Company is set at 1865.
These priorities were determined in the said general
adjudication decrees strictly in accordance with the water users' claims filed with the court. (Burton Decree Exhibit 1, vVater Users' claims Nos. 1 through 30A). (Also
original water users' claims-Defendants' Ex. 1).
(Note: In this brief whenever reference is made to
the ''Burton Decree'' it is intended to ref er to the first
decree of 1925 in the general adjudication proceedings
of the Virgin River System; and when reference is
made to the "Cox Decree" it is intended to refer to the
final decree of 1931).
In the case at bar the court granted plaintiffs' motjon for a summary judgment which in effect decreed
that the prior McCarty Decree must supercede and prr-

5
vail over the latter general adjudication decrees, to the
end that the priorities of the water rights of the plaintiffs and the defendant Glendale Irrigation Company in
the later general adjudication decrees are set aside and
held for naught, and all of such rights are entitled to
an equal or common priority.
From such judgment and decree this appeal has
been taken by the defendant irrigation company and
the State Engineer.
In the years 1956 and 1961, after some inquiries

made by the plaintiffs or some of them to the State Engineer concerning priorities, the State Engineer issued
his orders to the water commissioner to distribute the
water according to the Burton and Cox Decrees (Tr. 59).

In October, 1961, respondents filed their complaint
in the District Court of Kane County, Utah, attached a
copy of the McCarty Decree dated April 18, 1900, and
pleaded in substance that the McCarty Pecree established the water rights therein mentioned without regard
to any priority date as between the parties thereto (Tr.
1 to 8 inc.). It is then pleaded that the McCarty Decree
was administered and followed from the date of its
entry and including the present time without regard to
any priorities. It is also pleaded that the priorities of
the various plaintiffs is equal or superior to the priority date of the defendant irrigation company (Tr. 2).
Later and in May, 1964, an amended complaint was

6

filed dismissing one Chas. Anderson as a defendant
and deleting all reference to any fraud having been perpetrated against the plaintiffs under which the defendant irrigation company procured an earlier priority
than that a;warded the plaintiffs (Tr. 26-33). This
amended complaint alleges:
'' * * * that as a result of some language in
the Burton and Cox Decrees the defendant Glendale Irrigation Company contends, and the Statr
Engineer has ruled and so administered the strearn,
that the defendant Glendale Irrigation Company
has been awarded a priority date superior to and
earlier than those priority dates of the plaintiffs
,,, '' * Tr. 28) ".

It is also alleged that neither the Burton Decree

nor the Cox Decree was ever intended to provide any
priority date superior to any other priority date established for a user on the East Fork of the Virgin River
* * * and that ''the Burton and Cox Decrees must be
interpreted to establish an equal priority date in each
of the plaintiffs and defendant Glendale Irrigation Company" (Tr. 28-29).
The complaint alleges a damage of $10,000.00 because (by order of the State Engineer) they were deprived of some water in the years 1961 and 1962 through
the enforcement of the general adjudication decrees (Tr.

29).
In essence the plaintiffs are asking that the general adjudication decrees, although standing undisturbed

7
for between 35 and 40 years, should now be disregarded
and a decree entered at this late date amending the
prior ones by enlarging upon some rights and reducing
others.
The State Engineer filed his answer to the amended
romplaint admitting that the McCarty Decree did not
designate the priority of water rights by specific dates;
denying that the McCarty Decree states the f}nantity of
water that a share represented; and admitting that he
ordered the water commissioner to administer water of
the East :F'ork according to the general adjudication decrees (Tr. 39-40). The defendant Glendale Irrigation
Company answered, pleading several defenses, to-wit:
1. That the amended complaint fails to state a claim

against the defendant upon which relief can be granted.
2. That the action, as against the defendant, is
barred by the provisions of Sect,ion 78-12-26(.3) U.C.A.
1958, and also barred by the provision of Scrtion 78-1223,

U.C.A.

1.95.'l.

3. That the action is barred by the doctrines of
latches and unreasonable delay in bringing the action.
4. That on or about the 12th day of December, 1925,
the District Court of \¥ ashington County, in the said
general adjudication proceedings, Civil No. 270, made
and entered its decree in which the water rights of the
plaintiffs and defendants were adjudicated as to period
of lHH', volume of flow, acreages and respectiYe priori-

8
ties; that on or about the 21st day of April, 1931, in the
said cause the District Court made and entered its supplemental and final decree, again setting up the respective awards, among others, of plaintiffs and defendant,
or their respective predecessors in interest; that the
parties to said decrees were dnly and regularly advised
and notified of the respective priorities being a:wardccl
to the various water users, and were duly advised and
notified of the entry of the decree and its contents; that
the appeal period expired in 1931; that no appeal was
taken therefrom by any of the plaintiffs or their predrcessors in interest; that the said decree has long since
become final and ever since its finality has been and
now does remain in full force and effect and its terms
and provisions are res judicata; that the plaintiffs are
now estopped from setting up or claiming any rights to
water, particularly as to priorities different than as set
forth in said decree.

5. A general denial of the allegations of the amended complaint, excepting an admission as to the existence
of the McCarty Decree and its contents (rrr. 34 to 3fi
inc.).
Defendant Glendale Irrigation Company served and
filed its motion for summary judgment and iu support
of the motion defendant ref erred to the pleadings and to
portions of the files and proceedings, including the water users' claims filed in the Virgin River general adjudication decree.

These portions of the files and pro-

9

ceedings were theretofore introduced and admitted in
evidence in a pre-trial of the cause and a hearing upon
the defendants' motion for a summary judgment (Tr.
41-42). This motion for a summary judgment has never
been either granted or denied, except insofar as the
later granting of plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment implies the denial of defendants' motion.
Some short time later the plaintiffs filed their motion for a summary judgment (Tr. 43-44)
After at least one pre-trial hearing, without any
pre-trial order ever having been ordered or made, and
on the 11th day of September, 1963, the defendant irrigation company filed its affidavit of bias and prejudice
and certificate of good faith, asking that the Hon. Ferdinand Erickson, Judge of the District Court of the
Sixth Judicial District, disqualify himself as the trial
judge in this case (Tr. 63-4-5). Judge Erickson questioned the legal sufficiency of the affidavit and entered
an order certifying the affidavit to Judge C. Nelson
Day (Tr. 66), who thereafter filed a memorandum decision referring the matter back to Judge Erickson (Tr.
GG-70). In this memo decision Judge Day sets forth in
part:
''This action was brought for the determination of certain water rights under or in connection
with prior decrees of the District Court of the
State of Utah. There had been pre-trial hearings
and also hearings on motions for summary judg-

10

ment; however there has been no trial of the case .
. At that state of the proceedings there had been
some meeting of the litigants at which none of the
counsel appeared but where the District Court
Judge appeared and there was some informal
discussion between the Judge and such litigants.
It was following such meeting and at least partly
as a result thereof that the said affidavit was
filed herein" (Tr. 67).
After interrogatories were served and answered and
depositions taken by the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs on June
10, 1964, filed a further motion for summary judgment
(Tr. 76-77).
On November 5, 1964, Judge Erickson signed a
memo of decision (Tr. 139-151); and on January 15,
1965, there were filed Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law (Tr. 152-160), and a summary judgment and decree (Tr. 161-164 ).
POINTS URGED FOR

REVERSAJ~

1. That the court erred in not granting the summary
judgment made and filed by the defendants.
2. That the court erred in granting the plaintiffs'
motion for a summary judgment.
3. That the court erred in not disqualifying himself
as the trial judge upon the filing of the affidavit of bias
and prejudice and filing of the statutory certificate.
4a. That the answers to the interrogatories and the

11

depositions, together with the exhibits admitted and received in evidence do not jus.tify the granting of a summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs;
4b. That the court erred in making its Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law, and that the pleadings,
answers to interrogatories and the depositions do not
support such Findings and Conclusions.
4c. That the court erred in making and entering
the summary judgment and decree.
5. The trial court erred in ordering the State Engineer to distribute the waters of the East Fork of the
Virgin River in accordance with the McCarty Decree
and not the Burton-Cox Decree.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING THE SUM-

MARY JUDGMENT
DEFENDANTS.

MADE AND

FILED

BY THE

It is obvious that the plaintiffs should not prevail

upon the alleged cause of action pleaded in their amended complaint-this for any number of reasons, any one
of which is sufficient to bar plaintiffs' right to the relief prayed for.
The facts pleaded in the amended complaint, tog-ether with the factual situation shown by the files in
the general adjudication proceeding involving the waters
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of the Virgin Ri\'er, conclusively show that the plaintiffs
and/ or their predecessors in interest filed their respective water users' claims setting up their priorities aR
claimed by them (Defts Ex. No. 1, Claims No. 1 through
No. 30A). All of the claims of the plaintiffs show priorities later than the 1865 of the defendant Glendale Irrigation Company. Based upon such water users' claims,
and after a consideration of objections and protests and
hearings thereon, and, it must he assumed, upon competent evidence, the Court on December 12, 1925, made
and entered a decree (printed decree entered by Thos.
H. Burton, Judge, dated Dec. 12, 1925, on file in office
of State Engineer).
This decree held open the Court's jurisdiction to
correct errors, etc., and on April 21, 1931, the Court
made and entered its final decree (Defts. Ex. No. J,
File Marked 1930 and 1932).
In both the first and the later final decrees the respective priorities are distinctly set forth.
No appeal from the final decree waR taken by any
of the plaintiffs.
The summary judgment should have been granted
on the basis of the defendant Glendale Irrigation Cornpany 's fourth defense as pleaded in its answer to the
amended complaint (Tr. 36), which is the defens<:> of
res judicata.
This defense pleads that the Cox Decree of 10:11
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became final in that year and no appeal having been
taken, is now res judicata; that after this long lapse
of time plaintiffs are now estopped from attacking the
decree.

In the case of Huntsville Irr. Assn. vs. District Court
'
72 Utah 431, 270 Pac. 1090, this Court held that a general adjudication proceeding was not a determination of
rights to the use of water as between claimants and
users on one side and the State of Utah on the other,
but was a determination of rights to the use of water
as between and among the clairnants and users themselves. The Court in that case held:
"Sections 2 to 28, inclusive, of Chapter 67,
Session Laws of Utah, 1919, present a comprehensive plan for the determination of water rights
pertaining to a river system. rrhe form of action
was evidently intended to apply where many persons claim rights to the use of water from such
source of supply. One of the purposes of the
statute was to prevent piecemeal litigation in the
determination of water rights and determine them
all in one action * * * Another purpose of the
statute, evidently, was to make a permanent record of such rights by decree of court instead of
permitting the evidence to rest in parol. The
statute, as before stated, provides that the claim
filed by the claimants shall stand in the place of
pleadings and issues may be made thereon.'' (See
page 1094 of Pac. 270 of the Huntsville case).

It was and is claimed by the plaintiffs, and apparently the lower court has adopted that view, that the

1.t

l\IcCarty Decree places all of the parties on an equal
priority. The McCarty Decree makes no pretense of
settling the matter of priorities among the water users
but sets out the proportions of water to which each party
was entitled. From a reading of the McCarty Decree it
is apparent the matter of priorities was not an issue,
and this is understandable because in 1900 and for
years prior thereto the matter of priorities was of little importance, there being ample water, but in any
event the decree indicates that the issue of priorities
was not before the court.
However, even if it be assumed that the McCarty
Decree does place each of the parties on an equal priority basis, there is no reason to assume that thereafter
such rights could not be changed by subsequent condi·
tions, or by mutual consent, contract or otherwise. To
assert that a right acquired long prior to 1900 must re·
main the same in 1925 or 1931 is to assert something
that is not true. Suffice it to say that as early as 1924,
Orderville Irrigation Company, Mt. Carmel Irrigation
Company and a number of others joined in an objection
to the proposed determination requesting that the court
in the general adjudication case treat their respectirr
rights as these rights (so plaintiffs claim) had been ck
termined by the McCarty Decree. Portions of the objections are quoted in .Judge Erickson's findings (Tr. 155)
showing that the protestants requested a priority date
of 1870, to be divided as provided in the ~,foCarty De-
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c:ree. The same finding recites that the court in the general adjudication case, and after the filing of the objection by Judge Knox, made some changes and apparent
corrections, such as increased period of time on all
year's use, denying a request for increase of acreage,
etc. (Tr. 155). Again in Hl30 a further petititon was
filed referring to the .McCarty Decree and stressing only
that they wished a right to the use of waters on the
East Fork as a year around use in accordance with the
McCarty Decree, but apparently did not again ref er to
a change of priorities (Tr. 155-156).
It is asserted by the defendants and found by .Judge

Erickson that because the court in the Virgin River case
refused to increase an acreage from 13.7 acres to 25.7
acres, as requested in the petition, there is implication
that the court intended to grant the petition giving all
the rights a common priority date (Tr. 156). There is
no substantial evidence-in fact no evidence-to sustain
imch a finding. However, suffice it to say that each of
the plaintiffs filed its and his water user's claim, that
the priorities as so set up were adopted by the court in
both the decrees of 1925 and 1931; that the plaintiffs
protested the differences in the priority dates and expressly petitioned that all the rights be placed on a
common priority; that plaintiffs were advised of the
rontents of the final decree setting up the priority dates
in accordance with their water users' claims; and that
they did not see fit to appeal therefrom. Now, after a

lG
span of over thirty or thirty-five years this action was
commenced in an effort to amend and modify the decree.
There is no rule more elementary than the rule of
law that a former judgment becomes merged in a later
judgment when the same issues are involved and the
parties are the same. The former judgment has lost its
validity and has expended its force and effect. Whether
the Virgin River decree, when it became final, differs
from the McCarty Decree upon which respondents rely,
is now a matter of no concern to this Court. Assuming
the Virgin River decree, insofar as it affects the rights
of the respondents, could or would have been reversed
upon a direct appeal-nevertheless it is now binding
upon them.
''Rights acquired by virtue of a judgment or
decree (as claimed by respondents in 1900 under
the l\[cCarty Decree) are liable to be terminated
in the same manner. Consequently, though a matter has once been litigated to a final judgment, if
it is subsequently relitigated and adjudicated, the
last judgment controls and determines the rights
of parties. The second judgment cannot be collaterally impeached by showing the first." Freeman on Jud_qments, 5th Ed. Sec. 629, citing numerous cases.
The lower court m the case at bar recognized this
principle of law, and has endeavored to circumvent the
rule by finding that neither Judge Burton who signed
and entered the 1925 decree, nor Judge Cox who sigiwrl
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and entered the 1931 decree, ever intended to provide
any priority date superior to any other priority date established for a user on the East Fork of the Virgin
River, and that these decrees must be interpreted to establish an equal priority date between plaintiffs and defendant Glendale Irrigation Company (Tr. 159).
It is a well settled rule of law that issues once
raised in an action to which the parties in a later litigation are the same and which issues are litigated by a
court of competent jurisdiction, are subject to the rules
of res judicata, and that the respective parties to such
litigation are estopped from again raising those same
issues in future litigation. This rule is so well settled
that it seems idle to cite authorities. These rnles are
set forth at length in Freeman on .Judgments, 5th Ed.,
Sec. 626 and 627.
The rule of law and the cases go so far as to hold
that even though the court was palpably in error by applying the law, the judgment when final cannot later be
assailed.
"By the rules of the civil as well as of the
common law res judicata is not changed by a
change in the form of action. It is not material
that the form of action be the same, if the merits
'vere tried on the first. A party cannot, by varying the form of action or adopting a different
method of presenting his case, escape the operation of the principle that one and the same cause
of action shall not be twice litigated." Sec. 684
supra.
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Sec also:
Mathews vs. lllathews, 102 Utah 428, 132 Pac.
2nd 111;
State vs. Erwin, 101 Utah 365, 120 Y?d 285;
8ol011d L·s. Niclros, 79 Utah 381; 10 P2d 930.

This court has had occasion to pass upon the relitigation of water rights once determined.

The main sub-

ject of controversy in the case of Logan, Hyde Park

&

Smithfield Canal Co. L'S. Lapan City, 269 Pac. 777,
72 Utah 221, was the superiority or priority of rights

to the use of waters as between opposing sides.

There

the principal of contention of the appellants was that
the trial court erroneously decided this question. The
court held that as to what the parties contemplated, it
might look no further than the pleadings (which in the
general adjudication action was the filing of water users'
claims and the State Engineer's proposed determination, if there was one) and the findings and judgment
in this action. The court further stated ''these arc the
things made res judicata by that decree and the legal
effect of the adjudication is to forever bar any of the
other parties- to the decree from asserting any ad,-ersc·
claim to such rights.''
We believe that a case on all fours with the instant
one is the case of Logan City L'S. Utah Power and Lz'.qld
Co., 86 Utah 340; 16 P2d 1097. In that case a demurrer
was interposed to the complaint on the gToumls "that

the complaint shows on its face that all of the matters
relied upon by plaintiff for its cause of action have been
determined and adjudicated in two former suits" and
"that the complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a case of action.''

The demurrer was sustained

on both counts and the action was dismissed.

On appeal

this Court affirmed, It was there stated:
''There are no maxims of the law more firmly established, or of more value in the administration of justice, than the two which are designed
to prevent repeated litigation between the same
parties in regard to the same subject of controversy, namely, interest rei publicae, ut sit finis
litium, and nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadam
causa. If the court had been mistaken in the law,
there is remedy by 'vrit of error. If the jury has
been mistaken in the facts, the remedy is by motion for new trial. If there has been evidence discovered since the trial a motion for new trial will
give appropriate relief. But all these are parts of
the same matter. So in a suit in chancery, on
proper showing a rehearing is granted. If the injury complained of is an erroneous decision, an
appeal to a higher court gives opportunity to correct the error. If new evidence is discovered after
the decree has become final, a bill of review on
that ground may be filed within the rules prescribed by law on that subject. Here, again, these
proceedings are all part of the same suit, and the
rule framed for the repose of society is not violated.''

In the case above cited Justice Elias Hansen has
gone fully into the law concerning a relitigation of issues

I

I
I
I

and conclndes ''the fact that the officers of the city
misconceived the legal effect of the <lecree docs not affect the finality thereof." It would serve no good pnrpose here to quote voluminously from that case since this
Court is, without question, fully aware of its own de-
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I
I

ClSlOll.

On rehearing of the above Logan City case, cited in
86 Utah 354, 44 P2d 6.98, this Court again announced the

I

I
I

legal principle by stating:
''In suit against city involving construction
of decree entered in former suit, city might have
litigated validity of decree, and where it did not
do so, it would not attack such decree in a third
suit.''
In the case of Frost vs. District Coitrt, 96 Utah
106, 83 P2d 737, an attempt was m,ade to amend an es-

tablished water right.

The decree so establishing a

water right was made on November 14, 1932. A motion
was then made to amend and modify the findings or
make more certain matters relating to priority. The
motion was denied and no appeal was taken. ]~our years
later a motion was made to have the court amend and
modify the decree to the extent of changing a priority
date, by asserting that the change sought was a correction of a clerical error. A demurrer to the motion was
made "that the court was without jurisdiction to amend
the decree or correct the alleged clerical error; that the
entered and filed in 1932 was a final
.J'udo'ffient
,,..,

judgwent

I

I
I
i
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and that no appeal had been taken from that judgment."
'l'he lower court allowed the modifications.

On appeal

this Court reversed and stated:
''The court cannot under the guise of correcting its record put upon it an order or judgment
it never made or rendered, or add something to
either which was not originally included, although
it might and should have so ordered or -adjudged
in the first instance. It cannot thus repair its own
lapses and omissions to do what it could legally
and properly have done at the right time. A
court's mistake in leaving out of its derision something which it ought to have put in and something
in lieu of which it intended but failed to dispose,
is a judicial error, not a mere clerical misprision
and cannot be corrected by adding to the entered
judgment the omitted matter on the theory of making the entry conform to the actual judgment."
.Justice -Wolfe, in a concurring opinion states that
"the inclusion of a priority date is something quite substantial and not clerical or minor" and that even retaining jurisdiction by the court to correct errors does not
include the changing of a priority clat0.
What the plaintiffs in the instant case are trying to
do is exactly what was attempted in the foregoing Frost
case. Consider Finding No. 11 (Tr. lfJ9) wherein .Tudg0
Erickson finds:
"that if the Burton-Cox Decrees do purport
to establish a higher priority date in the defendant
Glendale Irrigation Company than in the other
parties to this action, the 8ame is a result of an

error or a clerical oversight and said decree should
in equity and in good conscience be interpreted
and construed so as to provide a common and equal
priority date as bebveen all of the parties to this
action.''
The Burton and Cox Decrees do actually and in
clear and unambiguous language set up the respective
priorities of the parties and the attack thereon is what
the plaintiffs claim and the court finds "the same is a

result of an errnr or a clerical oversight." The Frost
case, never overruled or modified, disposes of plaintiffs'
pm;ition in the instant case. As stated by J nstice Wolfe
in the concurring decision in the Frost case, ''the inclusion of a priority date is something quite substantial
and not clerical or minor'' In the instant case the
changing of a priority date is the sole thing attempted
to be accomplished by plaintiffs.
We conclude our argument on Point I by again saying the plaintiffs or their predecessors very easily could
have taken an appeal from that portion of the final decree in the Virgin River general adjudication case affecting their rights; and having been represented by
competent counsel and having failed to do so, cannot
thirty years or more later, under the guise of "interpreting the decree,'' materially alter and amend or modify the same.
It is contended by this defendant that the plaintiffs
cannot prevail upon their amended complaint, as show1i
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by the allegations therein pleaded, because of latches.
The plaintiffs have slept upon their alleged right to
complain about the priorities of the respective parties
as set up in the Virgin River decree. 'rhey made no
complaint and took no steps for over thirty years to
rectify the alleged failure of the court to follow the 1\IcCarty Decree in the matter of priorities.

It is a familiar rule that equity aids the vigilant,
not those who slumber upon their rights. ·wholly independent upon any statutory periods of limitation, equity
discourages latches by making it a bar to relief and to
prevent the enforcement of stale demands of all kinds.
In Pomeroy on Equity Jurisprudence, 4th Ed. Vol
1, Sec. 419, at page 785, it is stated:

''A court of equity, which is never a_ctive in
relief against conscience or public convenience has
always refused its aid to stale demands where the
party has slept upon his rights and acquiesced for
a great length of time. Nothing can call forth
this court into activity but conscience, good faith,
and reasonable diligence."
The criterion in all instances of this species
is that the party had knowledge or information of
certain matters in pais, which, although not directly tending to show the existence of a prior conflicting right, are sufficient to put him as a prudent man, upon an inquiry; that he is charged
with constructive notice of all that he might have
learned by an inquiry prosecuted with reasonable
diligence; a legal presumption arises that he has
obtained information of what he might thus have
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lcarne<l * •· * Pomeroy, supra, Vol. 2, Sec. 610,
page 11.55.
Equity will not permit him to stand by and
permit the other party who holds the legal title,
to improve and develop the property until it has
become valuable or greatly increased in value and
then assert his right * * * \Vhere important evidence in behalf of the defendant has been lost during the delay of the complainant, he will generally
be barred from all relief. The loss may result
from the deatll or incapacity of some of the witnesses. Again, the delay may be so long that under the circumstances many of the important facts
have become obscured. To allow a complainant relief in such cases ·would frequently risk a great
hardship to innocent parties and consequently the
courts decline to interfere. Pomeroy, supra, 4th
Vol., Sec. 1443, Page 8424-5.
Defendants contend that after this long lapse of
time the individuals who had the most knowledge of the
circumstances surrounding the claim of equal priorities
are not now available. The state engineer has not maintained as complete a record of the distribution of water
as could have been done to establish whether or not the
waters of the East Fork of the Virgin River were distributed as now claimed by plaintiffs. The age and recollection of the important witness, Marcellus Johnson,
upon whom plaintiffs rely as to distribution of water in
the early years, leaves much to be desired concerni11gcertainty of his testimony. Attorneys representing the
parties, including plaintiffs' mm counsel Judge Knox.
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and the Judges Burton and Cox before whom the objections of plaintiffs were presented, are no longer available. To say the least, the proof which defendants may
have found available some years ago, in order to dispute
the plaintiffs' present claims concerning the matter of
priorities have long since been lost. As a matter of
equity, the doctrine of latches should now he invoked
against the plaintiffs.
The necessity for invoking· the doctrine of "latches"
in favor of defendants and against the plaintiffs, and the
unfair position in which the defendants now find themselves is illustrated by portions of the findin~s upon
which plaintiffs rely to sustain their position.
Finding No. 10, last paragraph (Tr. 159) reciteH:
''The court therefore finds that neither the
Burton Decree nor the Cox Decree provides or
was ever intended to proride any priority dates
superior to any other priority date established for
a user on the East Fork of the Virgin Rinr."
Again in Finding No. 11, first paragraph (Tr. 159)
we find the following recitation:
''That the Burton-Cox Decree icas never intended to establish other than equal or common
priority dates between plaintiffs and defendants
in this action; that if the Burton-Cox Decrees
do purport to establish a higher priority date in
the defendant Glendale Irrigation Company than
in the other parties to this action, then the same
is a result of an error or a clerical oversight; that
the parties thrmselves havr placed a contempora-

neous and practical construction upon the terms
and meaning of the Burton-Cox Decrees so as to
provide an equal priority date for all of plaintiffs
and defendants and the users on the East _F'ork of
the Virgin River have been in accordance with the
interpretation and construction placed thereon bv
all of th(· users of water.''
·
-Whether or not the above findings can be supported by the evidence can be of paramount importance in
this case.

Had the issues now before the court been

raised in a case filed within a reasonable period after
the entry of the 1931 Cox Decree, both Judges Burton
and Cox, Attorney Knox, and many of the water users
were alive, and the matter of what was intended could
have been determined by these witnesses and not now
left to mere conjecture.
·we call attention to Finding No. 5 (Tr. 155) concerning filing of objections by Attorney Knox, and certain comments of the then Judge. Judge Erickson finds
that the denial by the then Judge of a right to increased
acreage implies that such court intended to grant the
petition insofar as it sought to change the period of use,
and provide common priority dates. Now that Judges
Burton and Cox are no longer available to testify as to
what they intended or what was implied, Judge Erick-

son's finding is a mere guess and the defendants at this
late date find it impossible to meet this issue.
The abo,'e are only a few illustrations of the unfair position with which the defendants arc• now con-
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fronted-all of which could have been avoided had a
timely action been instituted.
Defendants believe and assert that their motion for
summary judgment should be granted for the reason the
action of plaintiffs is barred by limitations.
Limitations of Actions. (within three years).

Sec. 78-12-26(3) U.C.A. 1953. An action for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake ; but the
cause of action on such ground shall not be deemed
to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the mistake.
A mere reading of the decree shows the dates of
priority assigned to each water user. This constitutes
actual notice. If the plaintiffs or any one of them had
any complaint concerning defendant Glendale Irrigation
Company's superior priority, and felt that a suit such
as the instant one, after the time to appeal had expired,
was proper, then such action should have been commenced within three years after the receipt of a copy
of the general adjudication decree.

8a. 78-12-25(2).

(Within four years).

An action for relief not otherwise provided
h:v law.

In the event Sec. 78-12-26 is held not applicable, then
surely this catch-all Sec. 78-12-2.5 should be held
applicable. The complaint of plaintiffs, when read as
a whole, clearly states a factual situation of which the
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plaintiffs were aware since the entry of the Virgin River
final decree in 1931.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR A SUMMARY JUDGMENT

It \Yould seem unnecessary to argue that if the defendants' motion for a summary judgment should have
been granted, then it was error for the lower court to
have granted the plaintiffs' motion for a summary judgment. In this case, if it be decided that plaintiffs' right
to relief is barr('d because of res judicata, latches, limitations, or any one of the affirmative defenses pleaded
in the defendants' answers, then of course the summary
judgment in favor of plaintiffs ought not to be granted.
To sustain a summary judgment, pleadings,
evidence, admissions and inferences therefrom
viewed most fa11orably to loser must show that
there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that
winner is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Rules of Ui1:il Procednrr,, R1tle 56( c). Frederick
May & Co. i:s. Dwin, 13 Utah 2d 40; 368 P2d 266.
Bitlloch vs. Deseret Dodge Truck Center, 11 Utah
2d 1; 354 P2d 559. In re Williams' Estate, 10 Utah
2d 83, 34R P2d 68.'l.

Defendant was not entitled to grant of its
motion for summary judgment although such a
motion was supported by affidavits and exhibits
and no counter-affidavits were filed by plaintiff,
where allegations in plaintiff's complaint stood iu
opposition to averments of the affidavits tbuR

ra1smg controverted issues of fact. Christensen
vs. Financial Service Co., 14 Utah 2d 101, 377 P2d

1010.

In the foregoing Christensen case the party moving
for summary judgment claimed entitlement thereto because its motion was supported by affidavits and exhibits, whereas no counter-affidavits were filed by plaintiff.
This Court held ''that a summary judgment can properly be granted under Rule 56 (c) only if the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file, together ·with affidavits,
if any, which are offered show without dispute that the
party is entitled to prevail. This condition is obviously
not met if the allegations of the plaintiffs' complaint
stand in opposition to the averments of the affidavits
so that there are controverted issues of fact, the determination of which is necessary to settle the rights of
the partieB."
Plaintiffs' amended complaint alleges factual situations, as well as pleading conclusions of law. Each and
every factual situation alleged has been denied by the
answers of the defendant Glendale Irrigation Company
1111d the State Engineer.
True, the lower court has made findings and stated
conclusions, which if sustained by a preponderance of
competent evidence at a trial, might support a judgment. In making this statement, appellants do not wish
to be understood as waiving their positions as otherwise
in this brief set forth, or as admitting that such posi-

tions are not tenable.
Defendants should have the right to produce witnesses in opposition to the allegations of the amended
complaint and to support its denials. 'rhe State Engineer
should have the right at a trial to show by his records,
both written and otherwise, if any such exist, that the
distribution of water during the past number of years
was not as claimed by plaintiffs, without regard to priorities. Paragraph 8 of the amended complaint (Tr.
28) precludes the plaintiffs' right to a summary decree
because such allegations are in direct conflict with paragraph 6 of the amended complaint (Tr. 27-38). In
paragraph 6 it is alleged that the McCarty Decree as to
its provision for priority dates ''Has been administered,
followed and observed in, and the same has controlled
and continuously been controlling, the administration
and distribution of all of the waters of the East Fork
from the date of its entry to and including the present
time and in each and every year since its entry, regardless of amount of water available in the East "F'ork and
its tributaries, the McCarty Decree has as to its priority
dates been applied and been exclusively the governing
instrument in administering and distributing all of the
waters of the East Fork." Paragraph 8 alleges "that
as a result of some language in the Burton and Cox
Decrees the defendant Glendale Irrigation Company
contends, and the defendant State Engineer has ruled
and so administered the stream, that the clef endant Glen-

:-n
<lale Irr. Co. has been awarded a priority date superior
to and earlier than those priority dates of plaintiff, and
when there is not sufficient water available in the East
:B1 ork to fill the respective rights in quantity that Glendale's decreed rights must be filled before any others
are furnished water.''
Based upon this admission in plaintiffs' complaint,
it ·would not be entitled to summary judgment.
The trial court was not entitled to accept every
statement in the depositions of plaintiffs' witnesses as
true and on the basis thereof, summarily render judgment against defendants, since the defendants were and
are entitled to cross-examination of these witnesses when
produced at a trial, and were and are entitled to produce
witnesses, exhibits and whatever eYidence is still availaule in support of their denials as set forth in their
respective answers and in opposition to the allegations
of the plaintiffs' complaint.
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT DISQUALIFYING HIMSELF UPON THE FILING OF THE AFFIDAVIT OF
BIAS AND PREJUDICE AND THE CERTIFICATION
IN SUPPORT THEREOF.

'rhe affidavit made by a director of the defendant
Glendale Irrigation Company (Tr. 64-5) recites that the
Hon. Ferdinand Erickson is and should be disqualified
from proceeding with the trial because of bias and prej-
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udice against the defendant and m favor of the plaintiffs ; that as reasons for his belief is the fact that said
Judge has on several occasions expressed himself as
feeling this case should not be tried and should be settled; that said Judge upon an occasion during the month
of February, 1963, (after at least one or perhaps two
pre-trial sessions) at Orderville, met with individuals,
both plaintiffs and defendants, and expressed himself
as feeling that the plaintiffs should prevail, that the
Burton Decree does not accord to the defendant corporation any priority in the right to water over any priorities of plaintiffs. As viewed by the Judge, that question of priorities is extremely important in the case before him-in fact it is the important issue. The Judge
having expressed an opinion that the plaintiffs should
prevail, and evidently having his mind made up to that
fact, justified the defendant in believing that the case
was pre-judged. ·when it appeared that the Judge had
already made up his mind, after pre-trial hearings, and
before according the defendant irrigation company and
the State Engineer their day in court, that the plaintiffs should prevail, gave the defendant irrigation company considerable concern; and the failure of the Court
to disqualify himself under the circumstance§ does not
appeal to this defendant as fair dealing or according to
lt the right of a fair and unbiased trial.

The fact that the summary judgment was granted

under the circumstances and record of this case, and
the manifest intention of the Judge to continue with the
case lends credence to the fact that the case was prejudged as set forth in the affidavit.
"\Ve are fully aware of the holding of this Court in
the following cases :

Haslam vs. Morrison, 113 Utah 14, 1.90 P2d 520;
State vs. Byington, 114 Utah 388, 200 P2d 723.
However, in both of these cases this Court has indicated strongly that it does not feel inclined to approve
a judge insisting upon presiding at a trial when his bias
and prejudice has been asserted in an affidavit of bias
and prejudice. It was said in the Haslam case :
The general practice in this jurisdiction has
been for judges to disqualify themselves whenever
an affidavit of bias and prejudice against them
has been filed. As a general rule we think this
is a commendable practice. The purity and integrity of the judicial process ought to be protected against any taint of suspicion to the end that
the public and litigants may have the highest confidence in the integrity and fairness of the courts.
'" * * It is ordinarily better for a judge to disqualify himself eve_n though he may be entirely free
of bias and prejudice if either litigant files an
affidavit of bias and prejudice. Next in importance to the duty of rendering· a righteous judgment is that of doing it in such a manner as will
beget no suspicion of the fairness or integrity of
the judge.

.J uclge \:V acle has this to say in the same case:
'' F'ew cases have come to the attention of this
court where a district judge has refused to make
a transfer upon application of a litigant. This i~
due largely to what I think is an almost universal
practice in this state for district judges to get another judge even on the mere suggestion of a party
litigant that the judge '.Vas biased or prejudiced.
This I consider a highly desirable practice and I
believe that such a practice has a very strong tendency to forestall and prevent any desire on the
part of litigants to ask for a change of judge in
bad faith."
Under the circumstances set forth in the affidavit
the defendant irrigation company cannot be charged with
acting in bad faith in applying· for a change of judge.
The lang·uage used by Justice vVade in the Byington case applies equally in this case. The language referred to is stated thusly:
''While defendant must establish actual bias
and prejudice and that the existence or non-existence of these elements must, in the first instance,
be determined by the trial judge, nevertheless, the
acts, conduct and pronouncement of the judge,
overwhelmingly preponderate against his finding
that hr was unbiased and unprejudiced."
POINT IV
Subdivsion A. THAT THE ANSWERS TO THE INTER·
ROGATORIES AND THE DEPOSITIONS, TOGETHER
WITH THE EXHIBITS ADMITTED AND RECEIVED
IN EVIDENCE DO NOT JUSTIFY THE GRANTING

OF A SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE
PLAINTIFFS.
Subdivision B. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING
ITS FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW, AND THAT THE PLEADINGS, ANSWERS ".l'O
INTERROGATORIES AND THE DEPOSITIONS DO
NOT SUPPORT SUCH FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
Subdivision C. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING
AND ENTERING THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
DECREE IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFFS.

Appellants will discuss all of these subdivisions together, since they are so interrelated that it would be
difficult to segregate and discuss them separately.
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submit that even a casual reading of the depo-

sitions of the three witnesses whose depositions were
taken by plaintiffs, do not show any positiveness upou
the part of any one of them concerning how the water
was administered and distributed from 1931 to 1961.
Their lmowledge of the distribution of water is vague
and without any foundation. None of the witnesses kept
any records, made any measurements, do not specify
when or in what degree water was distributed to Glendale Irrigation Company. To disturb a decreed right
should require a preponderance of competent evidence,
not a vague recollection. Moreover, the testimony, at
that stage of the proceeding, without a trial in which
the defendants would be given the opportunity to make
a showino·
of actual distribution methods, does not juso
tify the granting of the summary judgment.

·we submit also that findings of fact based upon
the intent of judges, one of whom is now deceased and
the other unavailable, and who entered the decrees thirty
and thirty-five years ago, cannot be sustained.
The findings include many conclusions that cannot
be sustained. F'or example, Finding No. 4 (Tr. 154)
''that the effect of the McCarty Decree was to establish
equal priority dates between the parties" when the issue
of priorities was not then before the court in the McCarty case, is not a finding but a conclusion not supported by any proper finding.
The Finding No. 5 (Tr. 154) that the objections or
protests of the proposed determination of the State Engineer in its priority awards "by subsequent orders,
rulings and actions of the court were in fact approved
and granted" cannot be sustained as based upon evidence. Such a finding is based only upon implication
and second guessing.
Finding No. 6 (Tr. 156) cannot be sustained as based
upon competent proof, either by the depositions, exhibits
or otherwise.
In an effort to bolster up the findings to support
the summary judgment and decree it is recited (Tr 155,
Finding No. fi, page 4 of said findings), that Judge
Knox, who appeared as counsel for the Orderville, Mt.
Carmel and Glendale Irrigation .Companies, filed objections on behalf of protestants, objecting to the different
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priority dates. These objections were not prepared and
filed by Judge Knox but prepared by individuals in December, 1924, before the Burton Decree was entered on
December 12, 1925 (Tr. 137-8). Thereafter, and before
the entry of the Cox Decree in April, 1931, and on December 11th, 1930, a protest was prepared and filed by
Judge Knox for a number of protestants (pages 24-5-6
of the original adjudication files marked 1930-1934).
These objections referred to water user's claims 1 to
30B. The objectors claimed a year-round use of water
as provided by the McCarty Decree, and asked for an
increase of acreage for one individual. The prayer
asks that the 1925 Burton Decree previously made b<'
modified ''and when a final decree is entered they be
awarded all the waters during the C'ntire year." These
objections malcc no mention wliatsoever to any change
of priorities as set forth in the previous Burton Decree.

It is thus seen that any and all recitals in Judge
Erickson's findings in the case at bar which imply that
the plaintiffs in 1930 and shortly prior to the final Cox
Decree of 1931 objected to the different priority dates,
or contended that the McCarty Decree placed all water
users on an equal priority basis, are in error and absolutely untrue.

The fact is that plaintiffs and/or their

respective predecessors in interest made no such claim,
and so far as the record discloses, were satisfied with
the priorities set forth in the previous Burton Decree.
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Findings Nos. 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 (Tr. 156-159) have
no foundation but are based upon conjecture, mere conclusions and unsupported by any competent proof.
It necessarily follows that the conclusions of law
that are not supported by adequate and appropriate find-

ings cannot be sustained. It follows also that the summary decree (Tr. 161-163) in effect vacating that portion
of the Burton-Cox Decrees setting up respective priorities of the parties litigant herein, and substituting a
different set of priorities, cannot be sustained.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE
STATE ENGINEER TO DISTRIBUTE THE WATERS
OF THE EAST FORK OF THE VIRGIN RIVER IN AC·
CORDANCE WITH THE McCARTY DECREE AND
NOT THE BARTON -COX DECREES.

We have in the McCarty Decree a decision which
confirms diligence rights for both parties, but fails to
define the elements of the individual rights. This decree
is completely silent on the ·subject of priorities and, as
we have previously noted, it cannot be construed as deciding· the rights between the parties by implication,
Sharp vs. Whitmore, 5-1 Utah -14, -168 Pac. 273 (1917).
On the other hand, the general adjudication statute specifically provides the procedure for the resolution and
determination of all questions of appropriation and
priority from the stream being adjudicated. The indi-

vidual users make their own declaration of the priority
of the right which they claim, Section 78-4-5, U.C.A. 1958.
This Court has made it clear that the user must file his
claim and have his right incorporated in the final adjudication decree whether or not it has been previously
decreed:
''The procedure upon a general determination,
after it has been initiated, is the same wliether the
action be commenced under the one section or the
other. In either case the state engineer makes
his surveys, investigations, and reports any proposed determination; he distributes the waters
until the final decree in the same manner, paying
due regard to the rights which have been established by decrees. All persons claiming rights in
the system, whether the same be decreed or not,
are required to come in and fi_le statements of
their claims. The statements stand in the place
of pleadings, and issues may be joined thereon.
Mammoth Canal & Irrigation Co. v. Burton, 70
Utah 23.9, 259 Pnc. 408 (1.9!27)
Also see Eden Irr. Co. v. District Court, 61 Utah
103, 211 Pac. 957 (1922) and Smith v. Dist. Court of 211d
Dist. of Morgan Co., 69 Utah 493, 256 Pac 589 (19/27)

The priority of the right awarded must be set forth in
the final judgment, Section 73-4-12, U.C.A. 195.'J. 'l'his
Court has stated those elements specified by the statute
must be contained in the findings of the court, Plai1t

City Irr. Co. r. Hooper Irr. Co., 87 Utah .145, 51 P.
(2d) 1069 (1.935).

The adjudication statute

reco~nizC's

that pr10r de-
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crees must be incorporated into the final decree of these
proceedings. Section 73-4-11, U.C.A., 1953, provides that
after the proposed determination has been prepared and
served on the parties :
''The State Engineer shall distribute the waters from the natural streams or other natural
sources in accordance with the proposed determination or modification thereof by court order
until a final decree is rendered by the court; provided, if the right to the use of said water has
been theretofore decreed or adjudicated said waters shall be distributed in accordance with such
decree until the same is reversed, modified, vacated or otherwise legally set aside.''
It is clear that these prior decrees are merged into
the final adjudication decree. There can be no other

interpretation. Any other result would circumvent the
very purpose of the statute in setting forth all the rights
on a source in one judgment. Certainly the plaintiffs
knew the implication of the respective priorities for the
various users from this stream. If this was not clear
from the specific awards themselves, the Burton Decree certainly left no doubt when recited in the general provisions that:
"When there is not sufficient water in the
Virgin River and its tributaries to supply all the
rights hereby decreed, the available water shall
be distributed to the various appropriators in accordance with their respective priori ties as herein
fixed, and no appropriator, except as specified
herein, shall be entitled to divert and use water
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hereunder for any purpose until said prior appropriators shall have been satisfied in full.
Where there are several rights of equal priority
and there is not enough water to supply all the
rights having such priority, the available water
shall be prorated in the proportion which the
quantity to which they are entitled bears to the
entire flow available to the rights of the priority
in question.''
This declaration leaves no question as to how the
waters are to be distributed to these users and makes
the ruling of the trial court in this matter entirely without foundation.
The record fails to show any distribution program
between these parties in the early years. This would
seem to indicate that there was no necessity for a full
time water commissioner until recent years. In both
1956 (Tr. 59) and 1961 (Tr. 40) when the question was
raised the State Engineer ruled that he was bound
to follow the provisions of the Burton-Cox Decrees and
the commissioner was to distribute the water according
to the clear and specific directions of these decrees. \Ve
submit there will be nothing but chaos and confusion in
the administration of water rights if every dissatisfied
user is allowed to go behind the adjudication decrees in
order to obtain an additional water right. If the State
Engineer, in carrying out his responsibilities in the administration and distribution of water under court decrees, Section 73-5-3, U.C.A., 1.953, cannot rely on a

general adjudication decree, he has no basis for settin"'
"'
up a distribution program. It is the duty of the engineer to strictly comply with the provisions of the final
decree on a stream in distributing the water to the
users. Caldwell v. Erickson, 61 Utah 265, 213 Pac. 182
(1923).

CONCLUSION
The respondents, under the guise of asking for an
interpretation and construing of decrees made and entered in 1925 and 1931, and from which no appeal wa~
taken, are seeking to have established for them priorities
of water rights other and more favorable than as established in such decrees.
We cannot overlook or agree with the court's finding (Tr. 159) which declares "that if the Burton-Cox
Decrees do purpo_rt to establish a higher priority date
in the defendant Glendale Irr. Co. than in the other
parties to this action, the same is a result of an error
or clerical oversight and said decree should in equity
and good conscience be interpreted and construed so as
to provide a common and equal priority date as between all the parties to this action.''
The legal effect of the summary judgment and decree is not to interpret and construe the prior decrccR,
which are not in any way ambiguous or uncertain, but
to vacate portions thereof and materially enlarge upon
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respondents' priorities, and to the same degree delete
an<l diminish Glendale Irrigation Company's priority
and the water rights of its numerous stockholders. If
this can be done, the value of any general adjudication
decree will be destroyed and its purpose and finality
set at naught.
\Ve conclude, therefore, that the summary jndgment
and decree should be reversed and the case remanded to
the District Court of the Sixth .r udicial District in and
for Kane County, Utah, with specific instructions to
rnter a summary judgment in favor of defendants, or to
imstain the affirmative defenses pleaded b~' defendant
irrigation company and dismiss the action: or in the
ennt this Honorable Court should determine that the
affirmative defenses are unavailing, and that the action
should not be summarily dismissed, then to remand this
case with instructions to the lower court to proceed with
a trial of the cause.
Resprctfully 8ubmittrd,
CLINE AND .JACKSOX

By SAM C'LrnE
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